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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of automat-
ically characterizing overall attitudes and bi-
ases that may be associated with emerging in-
formation operations via artificial intelligence.
Accurate analysis of these emerging topics
usually requires laborious, manual analysis by
experts to annotate millions of tweets to iden-
tify biases in new topics. We introduce exten-
sions of the Word Embedding Association Test
from Caliskan et al. to a new domain (Caliskan
et al., 2017). Our practical and unsupervised
method is used to quantify biases promoted
in information operations. We validate our
method using known information operation-
related tweets from Twitter’s Transparency Re-
port. We perform a case study on the COVID-
19 pandemic to evaluate our method’s perfor-
mance on non-labeled Twitter data, demon-
strating its usability in emerging domains.
1 Introduction
The World Economic Forum classified the mass
spread of misinformation as both a technological
and geopolitical risk, making it one of the main
threats to society (Howell et al., 2013). Social me-
dia applications play a principal role in the rapid
spread of user-generated content and provide a plat-
form for information influence operations to circu-
late among targeted groups of people (Freelon and
Lokot, 2020; Matsa and Shearer, 2018; Del Vicario
et al., 2016; Woolley and Howard, 2018). Informa-
tion operation detection remains an open problem
with the continuous high velocity and volume of
social media posts complicating identification, es-
pecially in emerging domains (Gupta et al., 2014).
To accurately characterize information operations,
manual identification and annotation of online con-
tent requires specialized area expertise and does
not scale (Gorwa et al., 2020).
In this paper, we select a practical, unsupervised
artificial intelligence (AI) method, the Word Em-
bedding Association Test (WEAT), and we apply
it to emerging domains by examining biases in
word embeddings trained on tweets (Caliskan et al.,
2017). WEAT quantifies human-like biases be-
tween two target groups and two sets of polar at-
tributes. Caliskan et al. use these tests on word
embeddings to replicate biased associations docu-
mented by the Implicit Association Test (IAT) by
using word sets of targets and attributes in the IAT
(Greenwald et al., 1998). Word embeddings are
vector space representations of semantics learned
via the distributional hypothesis. Since informa-
tion influence operations aim to generate panic and
sow distrust (Hindman and Barash, 2018), we ex-
tend the WEAT to our research domain by cre-
ating two bias tests: Calm/Panic and Trustwor-
thy/Untrustworthy. Calm/Panic addresses the ex-
tent to which text may express panic surrounding
a target, whereas Trustworthy/Untrustworthy ad-
dresses the extent to which text might frame a target
as untrustworthy; a target can be an individual or a
group. We include the original Pleasant/Unpleasant
bias test from Caliskan et al. to measure general
negative bias against an opposing target. Kurdi et
al. and Werntz et al. provide word sets that repre-
sent the polar extremes of calm, panic, trustworthy,
and untrustworthy sentiments that we use in our
bias tests (Kurdi et al., 2019; Werntz et al., 2016).
We select tweets from Twitter’s Transparency
Report, containing tweets related to state-backed
information operations, which have been manually
verified by experts (Twitter, 2018). Using historical
Twitter data that is linked to information influence
operations, we explore known biases against po-
litical and racial groups to validate our method.
We find that using our Calm/Panic and Trustwor-
thy/Untrustworthy WEAT tests, we can identify
the strong biases targeting individuals or social
groups in information operations corpora. Our find-
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ings showcase a novel AI tool, an extension of
the WEAT, that researchers studying information
operations may use to further guide research.
Our technique can be applied to new trending
topics, including those reflecting suspected infor-
mation operations, when annotated data is not read-
ily available. We include a case study for emerging
topics to validate the usability of our method on
non-annotated Twitter data by examining biases in
tweets surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. We
collect Twitter data, with tweets containing anti-
Chinese hashtags, over the course of one week to
investigate potential biased associations. Since the
COVID-19 outbreak originated in Wuhan, China,
we expected, and found, indications of anti-Chinese
biases. We further demonstrate that these biases are
associated with expressions of fear, panic, and neg-
ative sentiment; surprisingly, Russia is associated
with expressions of calm and positive sentiment.
2 Related Work
Automatically identifying emerging information
operations on Twitter has been explored using su-
pervised machine learning models (Gupta et al.,
2014; Liu et al., 2015; Buntain and Golbeck, 2017;
Im et al., 2019). These approaches require datasets
manually annotated by experts, which is a signif-
icant time-consuming limitation when analyzing
emerging topics. Similarly, tweets specifically tied
to health-related information operations have been
analyzed for spreading disinformation campaigns,
and all require manual annotation (Oyeyemi et al.,
2014; Ghenai and Mejova, 2017; Broniatowski
et al., 2018; Ortiz-Martínez and Jiménez-Arcia,
2017).
Twitter analysis has shown significant signals
indicating that Russia’s Internet Research Agency
(IRA) and other Russian coordinated information
influence operations aim to spread societal division
in the U.S. (Woolley and Howard, 2018; Freelon
and Lokot, 2020; Anderson et al., 2018). These
studies point to topics, such as the #BlackLives-
Matter campaign and the 2016 U.S. presidential
campaign, where IRA and Russian information in-
fluence operations inject discourse to disrupt the
information exchanges for a targeted group (Wool-
ley and Howard, 2018; Anderson et al., 2018; En-
tous et al., 2017; Hindman and Barash, 2018). We
use this research as the basis for selecting target
concepts in our experiments.
Caliskan et al. show that human-like biases
and veridical information are embedded in the
statistical regularities of language that are cap-
tured by word embeddings (Caliskan et al., 2017).
They present the WEAT, which is an unsupervised
method to quantify biases present in a language
corpus using word embeddings. The WEAT pro-
vides eight bias tests from the Implicit Associa-
tion Test (IAT), which is a validated bias measure-
ment method in social psychology (Caliskan et al.,
2017; Greenwald et al., 1998). Kurdi et al. in-
vestigate intergroup attitudes and beliefs using the
IAT, and find that implicit associations correlate to
intergroup attitudes (Kurdi et al., 2019).
3 Datasets
We choose two Twitter datasets with ground truth
information on bias associations: i) RU-DISINFO,
a corpus released in June 2019 that contains Rus-
sian information operation tweets released by Twit-
ter in January 2019, and ii) IRA-DISINFO, a cor-
pus released in October 2018 that contains tweets
traced to the IRA (Twitter, 2018). These tweets
were flagged by Twitter as “state-backed infor-
mation operations”. We generate lowercase, 300-
dimensional, Global Vectors for Word Represen-
tation (GloVe) word embeddings for each dataset
(Pennington et al., 2014). We refer to the Russia
word embeddings set as RU-DISINFO and Rus-
sia’s IRA word embeddings set as IRA-DISINFO.
To evaluate results on an emerging topic
(COVID-19), we use three sets of word embed-
dings: i) TWITTER-G, a general large-scale Twitter
control corpus that reflects baseline biases (Dev
and Phillips, 2019), ii) COVID-G, a general coro-
navirus related public dataset of tweets (Smith,
2020) collected during 12–22 March 2020, and
iii) COVID-AC, a set of tweets we collected dur-
ing 11–18 March 2020 that contain 14 hashtags
(see Appendix A.1), such as #wuhanvirus and #chi-
navirus, related to the COVID-19 pandemic and
targeting China and Wuhan.
For TWITTER-G, we use the lowercase, pre-
trained GloVe Twitter word embeddings1, which
are widely used word embeddings trained on 2 bil-
lion random tweets (Pennington et al., 2014). We
use TWITTER-G to obtain control results that cap-
ture known human-like biases (Dev and Phillips,
2019). Consistent with our experimental datasets,
we generate 300-dimensional GloVe word em-
beddings for the COVID-G (general COVID-19
1200-dimensional embeddings trained on 27 billion tokens
tweets) and COVID-AC (COVID-19 tweets with
China related hashtags) corpora. All the data, im-
plementation details, and source code are avail-
able in our public repository2.
4 Approach
We take the original implementation of WEAT that
measures biases in word embeddings trained on
language corpora, then extend it to study informa-
tion influence operations (Caliskan et al., 2017).
The WEAT takes two sets of target words (e.g.,
words representing African Americans and words
representing European Americans) and two sets of
polar attributes (e.g., words representing pleasant-
ness and words representing unpleasantness) and
computes an effect size (Cohen’s d) to measure the
bias associations between the target sets and polar
attribute sets. By definition, a |d| ≥ 0.80 indicates
a high effect size (Cohen, 2013). Formally, let
X and Y be two target word sets of equal size
and A and B be two polar attribute sets of equal
size. The effect size quantifies the standardized
differential association between the targets and
the polar attributes with the following formula:
s(X,Y,A,B) =
1
m
Σ~x∈Xs(~x,A,B)− 1mΣ~y∈Y s(~y,A,B)
σ~w∈X∪Y s(~w,A,B)
Where s(~w,A,B) = Σ~a∈A cos(~w,~a)−Σ~b∈B cos(~w,~b), and
σ denotes standard deviation. Cosine similarity is
the metric of association between the word embed-
dings. The one-sided permutation test (p-value)
measures the unlikelihood of the null hypothesis,
which is the probability that a random permutation
of the attribute words would produce the observed
difference in sample means (Caliskan et al., 2017).
We use our generated word embeddings, from do-
mains of interest, in our extension of the WEAT to
automatically discover biases in information influ-
ence operations.
We extend the original WEAT implementation
using the word sets in Appendix A.2. The calm,
panic, pleasant, unpleasant, trustworthy, and un-
trustworthy attribute sets are selected from prior
work in social psychology (Greenwald et al., 1998;
Kurdi et al., 2019; Werntz et al., 2016). We follow
the conventional stimulus selection criteria when
target words are not available in prior work (Green-
wald et al., 1998). We systematically select neutral
words that represent the target and their correspond-
ing hashtags (e.g., russia and #russia).
When word embeddings are trained on a small
2github.com/autumntoney/twitter-embeddings
corpus, or the word sets are considerably small
(fewer than 8 words), the bias score may be in-
significant. Adding more stimuli increases the
significance of the WEAT’s results. Both calm
and panic were represented with 4 words in prior
work (Werntz et al., 2016). Since some of those
words were not present in our embeddings trained
on a small Twitter corpus, we added synonyms
and antonyms to represent each attribute set with
5 words. TWITTER-G’s dictionary did not contain
many of the hashtags we used in the COVID-19
domain. Consequently, while representing Russia
and China in WEAT for TWITTER-G, we replaced
the hashtags with four major city names.
5 Results and Discussion
We first validated our method using the RU-
DISINFO and IRA-DISINFO word embeddings.
RU-DISINFO word embeddings: We implement
the Trustworthy/Untrustworthy bias test to measure
the association of the winning presidential candi-
date, Donald Trump, who U.S. government sources
determined was characterized by Russian informa-
tion operations as more trustworthy than the oppos-
ing presidential candidate Hillary Clinton (Woolley
and Howard, 2018; Bovet and Makse, 2019). The
Trustworthy/Untrustworthy bias test produces an
effect size of d = 1.27 (P = 0.023) using the
RU-DISINFO word embeddings, consistent with
prior research showing that Russian information
operations characterized Clinton as deceitful and
untrustworthy (Woolley and Howard, 2018; Bovet
and Makse, 2019).
IRA-DISINFO word embeddings: We imple-
ment the Calm/Panic bias test to measure the asso-
ciation of #BlackLivesMatter to calm and #Blue-
LivesMatter to panic, since prior work analyzing
IRA information operations on Twitter indicate the
IRA promoted the #BlackLivesMatter campaign
(Anderson et al., 2018; Freelon and Lokot, 2020).
The Calm/Panic bias test produces an effect size of
d = 1.14 (P = 0.036), indicating that the tweets
flagged as IRA information operations associate the
#BlackLivesMatter campaign to calm and #Blue-
LivesMatter counter-campaign to panic, consistent
with manual analysis (Anderson et al., 2018), such
as “group identities are at the core of the IRA’s at-
tack strategy . . . Black users were confronted with
an endless cavalcade of racism, often perpetrated
by white police officers”(Freelon and Lokot, 2020).
COVID-19 word embeddings: We implement
the Calm/Panic bias test and Pleasant-Unpleasant
Figure 1: Calm/Panic WEAT measuring Russia’s asso-
ciation to calm and China’s association to panic
Embeddings Targets Attributes d∗ p∗
COVID-AC Russia
vs.
China
Pleasant-
Unpleasant
1.04 0.016
COVID-G 1.17 <10−2
TWITTER-G -0.92 0.031
∗We report the effect sizes (d, rounded down), p values (p, rounded up).
Table 1: WEAT measuring Russia’s association to
pleasantness and China’s association to unpleasantness
bias test (see Table 1) across the TWITTER-G,
COVID-G, and COVID-AC, word embeddings to
compare results and identify bias shifts (see Figure
1). We find a strong pro-Russian and anti-Chinese
bias in the Calm/Panic bias test with an effect size
of d = 1.31 (P < 10−2) using the COVID-AC
word embeddings. The COVID-G word embed-
dings also contain a significant, but smaller effect
d = 0.85 (P = 0.045). Finally, in the TWITTER-
G word embeddings, bias drastically moves to the
opposite direction to d = −0.86 (P = 0.047). In
this control dataset, Russia is associated with panic
whereas China is associated with calm.
Counter-Experiments: Since the presidential can-
didate and the COVID-19 tests measure a pro-target
versus an anti-target (e.g., pro-Trump/anti-Clinton),
we run counter experiments to validate our results.
We run the Trustworthy/Untrustworthy bias test
on RU-DISINFO, substituting Bernie Sanders and
Barack Obama for Hillary Clinton to measure the
bias against another presidential candidate and the
current president of the U.S. from the opposite po-
litical party. Table 2 in Appendix A.3 validates that
our results reflect the targeted, disruptive discourse
from the Russian information operation for the
2016 presidential election, as Bernie Sanders has a
lower effect size (d = 1.03) and Barack Obama has
an insignificant effect size.
To investigate the scope of anti-Chinese bi-
ases, we ran Calm/Panic and Pleasant-Unpleasant
bias tests for numerous countries (country-x) on
COVID-AC. Consistent with our main experi-
ments, we select neutral, representative words
for each country (see Appendix A.4). China
vs. country-x bias tests indicate significant anti-
Chinese biases. On the other hand, Russia vs.
country-x strongly associates Russia with calm and
associates countries such as Germany (d = 1.00),
Iran (d = 1.10), and USA (d = 0.81) with panic.
All the WEAT tests with significant results indi-
cate pro-Russian biases. Nevertheless, some of the
Russia vs. country-x results are not statistically sig-
nificant potentially due to two reasons. First, we are
not able to identify 8 words to represent some coun-
tries accurately for the WEAT test. COVID-AC
embeddings are trained on a relatively small corpus
and accordingly contain a small set of vocabulary
words. Second, words with low frequency might
not be well represented in the embedding space.
Overall, our COVID-19 related results might re-
flect the state of these countries during the COVID-
19 pandemic. For example, the more widespread
COVID-19 in a country, the more negative its as-
sociations might become. Nevertheless, observing
consistent pro-Russian biases in a COVID-19 cor-
pus with anti-Chinese hashtags is an unexpected
finding that suggests further investigation into in-
formation operations might provide useful insights.
6 Conclusion
Using an unsupervised AI method to quantify bi-
ases expressed on Twitter, our novel approach al-
lows for real-time bias analysis of a given text
corpus, without requiring expert annotated data.
We extend WEAT to measure bias associations for
concepts central to influence operations such as
Calm/Panic and Trustworthy/Untrustworthy. Mea-
suring these biases can help track how influence
operations spread chaos and distrust in targeted
groups. We validate our method on Twitter data
linked to known Russian and IRA information op-
erations, selecting word sets that represent targeted
information campaigns (#BlackLivesMatter and
the 2016 U.S. presidential election). We iden-
tify pro-Russian and anti-Chinese biases in recent
COVID-19 related Twitter data. Various domains
can apply this practical method by selecting the
desired opposing targets (e.g., Russia vs. China)
to discover and measure the present biases. These
methods could be used to characterize attitudes on
social media platforms in advance of major world
events, such as the upcoming U.S. presidential elec-
tion, or the quickly evolving COVID-19 outbreak,
by automatically identifying emerging biases. If
unexpected biases are detected, researchers might
then examine whether these could be artificially
and deliberately introduced to the public sphere.
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A Appendices
A.1 Hashtags
Hashtags discussing the COVID-19 pandemic
and targeting China and Wuhan, many of
which expressed anti-Chinese sentiment are
#chinavirus, #wuhan, #wuhanvirus, #chinaviru-
soutbreak, #wuhancoronavirus, #wuhaninfluenza,
#wuhansars, #chinacoronavirus, #wuhan2020,
#chinaflu, #wuhanquarantine, #chinesepneumonia,
#coronachina, #wohan.
A.2 WEAT Stimuli List
In this section, we list all the word sets used in
each dataset for targets and attributes in the WEAT
experiments.
IRA-DISINFO - #BlackLivesMatter/Police:
#blacklivesmatter, #blm, #ferguson, #handsupdontshoot,
#icantbreathe,
#alllivesmatter, #backtheblue, #bluelivesmatter, #policelives-
matter, #thinblueline
RU-DISINFO - Trump/Clinton:
trump, #maga, @realdonaldtrump, #trump, #trump2016
clinton, #clinton, #clinton2016, #hillaryclinton, @hillaryclin-
ton
COVID-G&AC - Russia/China:
moscow, russia, russian, russians, #moscow, #russia, #russian,
#russians
beijing, china, chinese, wuhan, #beijing, #china, #chinese,
#wuhan
TWITTER-G - Russia/China:
moscow, novosibirsk, petersburg, russia, russian, russians,
volgograd, yekaterinburg
beijing, chengdu, china, chinese, shanghai, shenzhen, tianjin,
wuhan
All Embeddings - Pleasant/Unpleasant:
glorious, happy, joy, laughter, love, pleasure, peace, wonderful
agony, awful, evil, failure, horrible, hurt, nasty, terrible
All Embeddings - Calm/Panic:
calm, peaceful, quiet, relaxed, tranquil∗
anxious, fear, frightened∗, panicked, scared
All Embeddings - Trustworthy/Untrustworthy:
friendly, trustworthy, warm, sincere, nice, kind, supportive
selfish, mean, dishonest, cold, disloyal, untrustworthy, deceit-
ful
∗The word ‘tranquil’ was not present in IRA-DISINFO’s
dictionary. As a result, the word ‘tranquil’ from calm
attributes, and the word ‘frightened’ (chosen at random)
from panic attributes were deleted while running WEAT on
IRA-DISINFO.
A.3 Presidential Candidate Counter
Experiments
Embeddings Targets Attributes d∗ p∗
RU-DISINFO
Trump vs. Sanders Trustworthy-
Untrustworthy
1.03 0.051
Trump vs. Obama −0.39 0.737
Table 2: RU-DISINFO WEAT counter-experiments
Words used in presidential candidate Trustwor-
thy/Untrustworthy WEAT experiments are listed
below. We report the effect sizes and p-values for
the experiments in Table 2.
Donald Trump vs. Bernie Sanders:
trump, #trump, #maga, #trump2016, @realdon-
aldtrump
sanders, #sanders, @berniesanders, #feelthebern,
#berniesanders
Donald Trump vs. Barack Obama
trump, #trump, #maga, #trump2016, @realdon-
aldtrump
obama, #obama, #barackobama, #yeswecan,
@barackobama
A.4 Country-x Experiments
Words used to represent countries in Russia vs.
country-x Calm/Panic WEAT experiments are
listed below.
Russia vs. Germany - Calm/Panic:
moscow, russia, russian, russians, #moscow,
#russia, #russian
berlin, german, germans, germany, #berlin,
#german, #germany,
Russia vs. Iran - Calm/Panic:
moscow, russia, russian, russians, #moscow,
#russia, #russian, #russians
iran, iranian, iranians, tehran, #iran, #iranian,
#iranians, #tehran
Russia vs. USA - Calm/Panic:
moscow, russia, russian, russians, #moscow,
#russia, #russian, #russians
america, american, usa, washington, #america,
#american, #usa, #washington
